Skip Navigation

Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2005 21(2):164-177; doi:10.1093/oxrep/gri010
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (8)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Allen, F.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Right arrow G35 - Payout Policy
Right arrow K22 - Corporation and Securities Law
Right arrow L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
Right arrow M14 - Corporate Culture; Social Responsibility
Right arrow P31 - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
Right arrow P37 - Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol. 21 no. 2 2005 © The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies

Franklin Allen
University of Pennsylvania1

Most of the literature on corporate governance emphasizes that firms should be run in the interests of shareholders. This is an appropriate objective function when markets are perfect and complete. In many emerging economies this is not the case: markets are imperfect and incomplete. The first theme of the paper is that alternative firm objective functions, such as pursuing the interests of all stakeholders, may help overcome market failures. The second theme is that it is not necessarily optimal to use the law to ensure good corporate governance. Other mechanisms such as competition, trust, and reputation may be preferable.

1 Prepared for the ECGI/Oxford Review of Economic Policy conference on Corporate Governance (Saïd Business School, Oxford, 28–29 January 2005). I am grateful to my discussant, George Dallas, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 REV FINANC STUDHome page
L. A. Bebchuk and Z. Neeman
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics
Rev. Financ. Stud., June 3, 2009; (2009) hhp042v1.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.