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Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2005 21(2):243-268; doi:10.1093/oxrep/gri015
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Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol. 21 no. 2 2005 © The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe

Marc Goergen
University of Sheffield and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Marina Martynova
Tilburg University

Luc Renneboog
Tilburg University and ECGI1

This paper contributes to the research on corporate governance by predicting the effects of European takeover regulation. In particular, we investigate whether the recent reforms of takeover regulation in Europe are leading to a harmonization of the national legislations. With the help of 150 corporate governance lawyers from 30 European countries, we collected the main changes in takeover regulation. We assess whether a process of convergence towards the Anglo-(American) corporate governance system has been started and we find that this is the case. We make predictions as to the consequences of the reforms for ownership and control. However, we find that while in some countries the adoption of a unified takeover code may result in dispersed ownership, in others it may further consolidate the blockholder-based system.

1 We are grateful to the lawyers listed in the Data Appendix for their help. In particular, we would like to thank Rolf Visser from Deloitte Corporate Finance (Amsterdam) for allowing us to use the Deloitte database. We are grateful to the participants at the ECGI/Oxford Review of Economic Policy conference on Corporate Governance (Saïd Business School, Oxford, 28–29 January 2005)—in particular our discussant, Mike Burkart—and to the participants of the Workshop on Mergers and Acquisitions at the University of Utrecht in April 2005. We acknowledge financial support from the European Commission via the ‘New Forms of Governance’ project led by the European University Institute in Florence.


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