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Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2006 22(2):203-225; doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013
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Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol. 22 no. 2 2006 © The Author (2006). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Regulatory Capture: A Review

Ernesto Dal Bó
Haas School of Business and Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley1

Abstract

This article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture. The scope is broad, but utility regulation is emphasized. I begin by describing the Stigler–Peltzman approach to the economics of regulation. I then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three-tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information (in the spirit of Laffont and Tirole, 1993). I discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions, including models of common agency, revolving doors, informational lobbying, coercive pressure, and influence over committees. I discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes. I also review evidence on the revolving-door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes. The last section contains open questions for future research.

Footnotes

1 E-mail address: dalbo{at}haas.berkeley.edu


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